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Ego Depletion and Positive Illusions:
Does the Construction of Positivity Require
Regulatory Resources?
Peter Fischer
Tobias Greitemeyer
Dieter Frey
Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich
have shown that regulatory resources are a limited
resource similar to energy (Baumeister & Heatherton,
1996; Heatherton & Baumeister, 1996; for an
overview, see Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) and can be
depleted by various regulatory activities, such as the
control of thoughts, emotions, and behaviors, which are
required for decision making, self-presentation, or intel-
lectual performance (e.g., Schmeichel, Vohs, &
Baumeister, 2003; Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco,
2005; Vohs, Baumeister, & Tice, 2006). When this
resource is depleted, self-functioning is reduced as well.
In this context, the aim of the present research is to
examine whether the active self is necessary to construct
positive illusions. More precisely, we aimed to demon-
strate that ego-depleted (compared to nondepleted)
individuals exhibit lower degrees of optimism (positive
illusions) concerning their own abilities (Study 1), sub-
jective sense of control (Study 2), and optimistic future
expectations (Study 3). Moreover, we have attempted to
clarify the underlying psychological processes (Studies 4
and 5) that are expected to be associated (a) with the
decreased ability of ego-depleted individuals to generate
and/or retrieve positive information and attributes
about the self from their cognitive system and (b) an
overall reduced sense of general self-efficacy.
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Individuals frequently exhibit positive illusions about
their own abilities, their possibilities to control their
environment, and future expectations. The authors pro-
pose that positive illusions require resources of self-
control, which is considered to be a limited resource
similar to energy or strength. Five studies revealed that
people with depleted self-regulatory resources indeed
exhibited a less-optimistic sense of their own abilities
(Study 1), a lower sense of subjective control (Study 2),
and less-optimistic expectations about their future
(Study 3). Two further studies shed light on the under-
lying psychological process: Ego-depleted (compared to
nondepleted) individuals generated/retrieved less posi-
tive self-relevant attributes (Studies 4 and 5) and
reported a lower sense of general self-efficacy (Study 5),
which both partially mediated the impact of ego deple-
tion on positive self-views (Study 5).
Keywords: positive illusions; ego depletion; regulatory resources;
self-efficacy; self-regulation
The processing of self-relevant information often isbiased to serve the self, resulting in optimistic illu-
sions concerning one’s own abilities and personality,
controllability of the external environment, and expec-
tations about the future (cf. Taylor & Brown, 1988). In
the present study, we argue that optimistic illusions can
require considerable amounts of regulatory resources to
emerge (e.g., by activities such as defending own stand-
points, biased memory encoding and retrieval, suppres-
sion of threatening information, critical testing and
devaluation of self-inconsistent evidence). Recent studies
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Positive Illusions
Individuals have been found to exhibit positive illusions
about three major dimensions relevant to their self-esteem:
they frequently overestimate (a) their abilities and charac-
teristics compared with other people, (b) overestimate their
personal control over their environment, and (c) have opti-
mistic illusions about their own future (cf. Taylor &
Brown, 1988). With regard to own abilities (above-average
effect), most people appear to believe that they are more
athletic, intelligent, attractive, and so forth, than the aver-
age person (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, &
Vredenburg, 1995; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). The exag-
gerated perception of control is a second important area of
research on positive illusions (Taylor & Brown, 1988; see
also McKenna, 1993) and addresses the phenomenon that
people, for example, systematically overestimate the extent
to which they cause certain outcomes (Miller & Ross,
1975; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003)
or systematically overestimate the controllability of
chance-determined situations (for a review, see Crocker,
1982). The third area of positive illusions addresses
people’s tendency to be too optimistic about their future
life. For example, when asked about their chances of expe-
riencing negative events, such as being a crime victim
(Perloff & Fetzer, 1986), being unemployed (Weinstein,
1980), or becoming ill (Perloff & Fetzer, 1986), most
people underestimated the probability of experiencing such
negative events. By contrast, the probability of experiencing
positive events, such as bearing gifted children (Weinstein,
1980) or having a positive future at all (Markus & Nurius,
1986), is mostly overestimated.
Researchers in this field have suggested that optimistic
illusions can be based on a motivation to maintain a pos-
itive sense of self-esteem (Alicke, 1985; Brown, 1986;
Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Taylor & Brown, 1988).
With regard to this explanation, people systematically
report to be, for example, better workers, more athletic,
or better drivers than others (e.g., Alicke et al., 1995; for
a review, see Chambers & Windschitl, 2004) because
they attempt to bolster their general self-concept; at the
same time, such favorable self-descriptions protect one’s
self-concept from unfavorable frustrations, actions, or
events (Alicke, 1985). Other accounts explained positive
illusions and self-serving biases in terms of selective
encoding, processing, or retrieval of stored knowledge
(Kunda, 1990) as well as asymmetric testing processes
and biased reference points (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Ditto,
Scepansky, Munro, Apanovitch, & Lockhart, 1998).
Positive Illusions: Resource-Consuming or Automatic
Processes?
Most important to our arguments, we propose
that positive illusions can be based on deliberate,
resource-consuming rather than automatic, passive
processes. Concluded by results of former research (e.g.,
Ditto et al., 1998; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Fiske & Taylor,
1984; Snyder & Swann, 1976; Taylor & Crocker, 1981;
Tetlock, 1983), positive illusions are assumed to need the
active self and thus expend self-regulatory resources
because they can require activities such as defending own
standpoints, biased memory encoding and retrieval, sup-
pression of threatening information, or selective devalua-
tion of self-inconsistent evidence. For example, individuals
have been shown to moderate their opinions to fit them to
the opinion of significant others (Snyder & Swann, 1976;
Tetlock, 1983), select methods of communication that
preferentially solicit self-confirming feedback (Swann,
1983), or engage filters in their cognitive system to
encode, retrieve, and interpret information as being con-
sistent with their own opinions (Fiske & Taylor, 1984;
Greenwald, 1980; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Further
research has shown that ambiguous information tends to
be interpreted as consistent with prior beliefs (for a
review, see Taylor & Crocker, 1981), inconsistent infor-
mation is scrutinized more closely than is confirmatory
information (Ditto et al., 1998; Ditto & Lopez, 1992),
and inconsistent information is even actively excluded or
suppressed from the cognitive system (Shrauger &
Schoeneman, 1979; Taylor & Brown, 1988).
With regard to processes of mental control and
mental health, Freud (1915/1957) argued that individu-
als preserve subjective well-being by actively keeping
negative thoughts out of consciousness, which can be an
effortful and deliberate process. Derived from Freud’s
ideas, modern therapy employs techniques for control-
ling negative thoughts and emotions (e.g., Beck, 1976;
Ellis, 1962). In addition, modern theories of affect con-
trol (e.g., Clark & Isen, 1982) proposed that individu-
als are able to control negative thoughts and moods
directly by intentionally focusing away from negative
toward positive thoughts. Accordingly, self-distraction
is a frequently mentioned strategy for coping with
sorrows (Rachman & de Silva, 1978).
Further support from social psychology research for
the assumption that self-serving bias needs the control
of the self by the self is provided by studies showing that
biases in information processing and evaluation vanish
when people’s cognitive resources are impaired by com-
peting cognitive load tasks (e.g., Ditto et al., 1998;
Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Fischer, Jonas, Frey, & Schulz-
Hardt, 2005; Schulz-Hardt, Fischer, & Frey, 2007). For
example, Ditto and Lopez (1992) demonstrated that
inconsistent evidence is tested more critically (and thus
systematically devalued in comparison to consistent evi-
dence), whereas this tendency is reduced under cogni-
tive load (see also Ditto et al., 1998). In addition to this,
Zadro, Williams, and Richardson (2004) yielded that
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social exclusion—which was shown to consume self-
regulatory resources and thus works like an ego-depletion
manipulation (see Baumeister, DeWall, Ciaracco, &
Twenge, 2005)—leads to a lowered instead of increased
sense of control.
Although previous research was not intended to
directly test whether the construction of positive illusions
requires self-regulatory resources, it provides first hints
that the construction of positive illusions and self-serving
biases might be based on deliberate, active processes.
However, there is also other research to suggest that self-
serving biases increase (instead of decrease) when
people’s regulatory and cognitive resources are reduced. For
example, research on automatic egotism by Paulhus, Graf,
and Van Selst (1989) demonstrated that self-evaluation
while performing another concurrent load task led to
enhanced rather than decreased positive self-views,
thereby suggesting that self-enhancement is a rather auto-
matic process. Another series of studies by Fischer,
Greitemeyer, and Frey (2007) found that ego-depleted
participants exhibited a stronger confirmation bias in the
external search for attitude- and decision-relevant infor-
mation than did nondepleted individuals.1 This effect was
mainly driven by an increased commitment to the own
position of ego-depleted participants. In addition, Vohs
et al. (2005) found that ego-depleted participants
reported higher levels of narcissism than did nondepleted
participants.
Although these three lines of research did not directly
investigate the classic dimensions of positive illusions sug-
gested by Taylor and Brown (1988), which are investi-
gated in the present research, it at least suggests that
self-enhancement and self-serving processes also can be
more automatic rather than deliberative and resource-
consuming processes. To resolve these conflicting results,
we think that self-enhancement and self-serving biases
can be based on both automatic and deliberate processes,
whereas only for the latter case might ego depletion
impair the ability to construct positive illusions. In other
words, if positive illusions are based on more complex
processes, including complex defense processes, searching
the memory for favorable information, suppression of self-
threatening information, impaired regulatory resources
will lead to reduced rather than increased positive views
of the self. However, if only easy rules are required to
decide whether a specific piece of information supports
or contradicts the positive self-views, ego depletion might
even increase self-serving tendencies. Accordingly, it is
likely that the tasks in the three above-mentioned studies,
which found a self-enhancement effect (Fischer et al.,
2007; Paulhus et al., 1989; Vohs et al., 2005), were less
resource-consuming than tasks employed to investigate
the classic three dimensions of positive illusions suggested
by Taylor and Brown (1988). For example, in Fischer
et al.’s (2007) studies, participants decided by way of
short, main arguments as to whether they wanted to read
the related article in detail. Most important, each main
argument explicitly made clear whether the associated
article would be consistent or inconsistent with the own
standpoint; thus, it should have been relatively easy for
participants to select the consistent and reject the incon-
sistent. Furthermore, Paulhus et al. (1989) asked partici-
pants to rate themselves on traits, which again enabled
participants to follow a simple rule of embracing the pos-
itive and rejecting the negative. Similarly, in the research
of Vohs et al. (2005), it also was relatively easy to
respond to the narcissism scale in a self-serving manner
(no complex comparisons with other fictive persons,
extended memory search, or the development of future
conceptions were necessary to answer questions such as,
“If I ruled the world it would be a much better place” or
“I am going to be a great person”; Vohs et al., 2005,
p. 651). Moreover, participants in the Vohs et al. (2005)
studies expected the research to be on interpersonal
and/or communication processes. Thus, the increased
narcissism of depleted participants in Study 8 was medi-
ated by reduced levels of social desirability. It is likely
that interpersonal contexts (as was indeed demonstrated
by the authors) trigger completely different processes in
terms of self-regulation and self-serving biases (or self-
serving presentations, respectively) than statements about
the self that are not expected to be made to another
person or audience.
In summary, there is evidence that both (a) the emer-
gence of positive illusions requires the active response of
the self and (b) positive illusions are based on rather
automatic processes. We propose that the occurrence of
positive illusions as suggested by Taylor and Brown
(1988, i.e., above-average effect, illusion of control,
future optimism) requires self-regulatory processes,
such as defensive information processing, suppression
of threatening evidence or biased encoding, and
retrieval of self-relevant information. For example, the
above-average effect requires multiple and complex
comparisons between attributes of the own person
(with all its positive and negative attributes) and attrib-
utes of other (imagined) average individuals. Thereby,
individuals also must engage in an extended memory
search to determine their own positive attributes as well
as suppress potential negative ones. Moreover, positive
expectations about the person’s own future require tak-
ing proper perspective, memory search for positively
predicting personal attributes, and the development of
future conceptions, whereas illusions of control need a
strong sense of self-efficacy, which also can be regarded
as the impression of a well-functioning self. In short, the
classic three dimensions of positive illusions are likely to
consume self-regulatory resources when they occur.
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This assumption is further explicated and tested by the
present line of research.
Self-Control, Ego Depletion, and the
Construction of Positive Illusions
Self-control is defined as the exercise of control over
the self by the self (e.g., Schmeichel et al., 2003). Self-
control is employed when a person tries to change the
way he or she would normally think, feel, or behave
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), whereas self-control
behaviors are designed to maximize the individual’s
long-term best interests (Barkley, 1997). With regard to
the limited resource perspective, the self has only a lim-
ited amount of some resources that are similar to that of
energy or strength, which can be depleted when the self
overrides, changes, or regulates behavior and psycho-
logical responses (Baumeister, Bratlavsky, Muraven, &
Tice, 1998; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Muraven
& Baumeister, 2000; Schmeichel et al., 2003; Vohs
et al., 2005; Vohs et al., 2006). This self-regulation
resource can be used for several different tasks, includ-
ing inhibiting impulses, controlling emotions, regulating
thoughts, processing information, or dealing with frus-
tration. On that score, self-regulation is assumed to be
a general and basic resource that can affect various acts
of executive functioning and self-control.
Several studies support the assumption that self-
control is a limited resource by demonstrating that the
preceding exertion of self-regulation resources leads to
impairment of subsequent self-regulatory performance.
Typically, people have been asked to show self-regulatory
behavior, such as controlling their emotions or actively
guiding their attention. Afterward, the performance on
another self-regulatory task is measured (e.g., emotion
control, task persistence, intellectual behavior), with the
consistent result that the performance on the following
self-regulatory task is impaired as a consequence of the
prior self-regulatory task (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998;
Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Schmeichel et al.,
2003; Vohs et al., 2005). A variety of recent studies sug-
gest that the limited resource of self-regulation is
involved in different activities that are not directly
related to self-control, for example, intellectual perfor-
mance, decision making, impression management
and self-presentation, as well as active responding
(Baumeister et al., 1998; Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss,
2002; Schmeichel et al., 2003; Vohs et al., 2005; Vohs
& Faber, in press). Based on the above-mentioned line
of argumentation, we propose that the emergence of
positive illusions and positive self-views is based on com-
plex defense processes and thus requires self-regulatory
resources as well.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
The present research involved five studies that were
designed to test our hypothesis that ego depletion manipu-
lated by a prior self-control task reduces the construction of
positive illusions. Across all five studies, ego depletion was
first manipulated by having participants either perform
tasks that demanded self-regulation (e.g., thought suppres-
sion, emotion control) or perform alternative tasks that
were assumed to demand less self-regulatory resources.
Afterward, following the optimism-related threefold dis-
tinction of Taylor and Brown (1988), as dependent vari-
ables, we measured (a) comparative self-reported abilities
(above-average effect; Study 1), (b) subjectively experienced
controllability of a chance-determined event (illusion of
control; Study 2), and (c) optimism in future expectations
(future optimism; Study 3). The expected mechanisms—a
decreased ability of ego-depleted individuals to generate/
retrieve positive self-relevant information and a reduced
sense of general self-efficacy—were tested in Studies 4
and 5.
STUDY 1
Most of us appear to believe that we are more intelli-
gent, organized, attractive, and so forth, than the average
person (Alicke et al., 1995; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004;
Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Because self-representations
are affectively very important to the self (Prentice, 1990),
this phenomenon has traditionally been interpreted as
evidence of an important need to boost the self-esteem
(e.g., Taylor & Brown, 1988). Because self-presentations
are such central concepts, individuals are supposed to
engage in resource-consuming defensive processes (e.g.,
suppressing negative and highlighting positive self-
relevant attributes) when they compare their skills, attrib-
utes, and abilities with those of other people. In addition,
the above-average effect requires complex comparison
processes concerning oneself and imagined average
peers. Hence, we postulate that ego-depleted individuals
are less able to favorably compare themselves with peers
on important self-relevant dimensions compared to non-
depleted individuals.
Method
Participants and design. One hundred students (72
women, 28 men; 18-45 years of age; M = 23.55, SD =
3.80) from Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich, par-
ticipated in this experiment. It was based on a 2 (ego
depletion: low vs. high) × 2 (type of depletion manipula-
tion: cognitive vs. affective) × 4 (above-average dimension:
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intelligence vs. ability to learn vs. memory vs. work
organization) multivariate factorial design.
Material and procedure. After participants arrived
individually at the laboratory, they were first asked to
watch a short videotape. To increase ecological validity
(multi-method perspective), we employed both cognitive
and affective manipulations of ego depletion. The cogni-
tive ego-depletion manipulation (attention control) was
similar to the type of manipulation used by Gilbert, Krull,
and Pelham (1988) and Schmeichel et al. (2003).
Participants were asked to watch a 5-min videotape with-
out audio that featured the former German minister of
foreign affairs being interviewed. Participants were
informed that the experiment addressed nonverbal assess-
ments of personality characteristics and self-perception;
thus, they would be later making person-perception judg-
ments of the interviewed minister as well as reporting on
individual characteristics of this person. Beyond the min-
ister being interviewed, the tape contained a series of
well-known, one-syllable words (e.g., car, flower)
appearing at the bottom third of the screen. Each word
was shown for about 10 s and was printed in white let-
ters on a black background. These words had no rela-
tionship to the minister being interviewed or the content
of the interview in progress. The depletion manipulation
was carried out as follows. In the low-depletion condi-
tion, participants were given no instructions concerning
the irrelevant words on the bottom of the screen and
were not made aware of the words prior to viewing the
video. By contrast, in the high-depletion condition, par-
ticipants were instructed not to read or look at any words
that may appear on the bottom of the screen. In addition,
participants in the high-depletion condition were told to
redirect their gaze to the minister being interviewed
whenever they found themselves becoming aware of the
words on the bottom of the screen.
With regard to the emotional depletion condition
(emotion control), participants were informed that the
present study was investigating the association between
experiencing emotions and self-perception. Therefore,
the first part of the investigation involved watching a
funny cartoon movie, whereas the second part involved
remembering individual characteristics. In the high-
depletion condition, participants were instructed to try
not to show or feel any emotions while they watched
the movie (suppress emotions condition). To ensure that
participants followed this instruction, the experimenter
said that they would be videotaped while watching the
funny film (which actually was only bogus feedback).
By contrast, in the low-depletion condition, participants
were instructed to let their emotions flow while watch-
ing the movie, without any attempt to hide or suppress
these feelings. In addition, they also were told that their
reaction would be videotaped. Following these instruc-
tions, all participants watched a 5-min clip from the
U.S. cartoon series “The Simpsons.”
After being exposed to either the cognitive or affec-
tive depletion manipulation, participants reported on
four ability dimensions on a scale from 0 (definitely
worse) to 10 (definitely better) to what extent they com-
pare themselves with the average person. These dimen-
sions included “intelligence,” “ability to learn new
things,” “memory,” and “work organization” and were
similar to those used by previous authors (cf. Chambers
& Windschitl, 2004; Kruger & Dunning, 1999).
Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked for their
participation, and dismissed.
Results and Discussion
Means and standard deviations are given in Table 1. A
2 (ego depletion) × 2 (type of depletion manipulation) × 4
(above-average dimension) multivariate analysis of vari-
ance (MANOVA) revealed a significant main effect for
ego depletion, F(4, 93) = 2.88, p = .03, η2 = .11. Univariate
follow-up analyses revealed that participants in the low-
depletion condition reported a stronger above-average
effect for intelligence, ability to learn, memory, and work
organization than did participants in the high-depletion
TABLE 1: Means of the Experimental Conditions in Study 1
Experimental Condition
Low Depletion High Depletion F a η2
Intelligence 7.08 (1.32) 6.52 (1.34) 4.35* .05
Ability to learn 6.76 (1.49) 6.10 (1.45) 4.97* .05
Memory 7.08 (1.50) 6.20 (1.63) 8.12* .08
Work organization 6.82 (1.60) 6.08 (2.13) 3.83* .04
a. Univariate follow-up ANOVAs; df = 1, 96.
*p < .05.
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condition. Furthermore, the main effect for the ego-depletion
manipulation was qualified by a marginal interaction
between ego depletion and type of depletion manipula-
tion, F(4, 93) = 2.32, p = .06, η2 = .09, indicating that the
effect of emotional manipulation of ego depletion was
stronger than the effect of cognitive manipulation. No fur-
ther significant effects were obtained, all Fs < 1.
In summary, Study 1 revealed that participants with
low self-regulation resources were more realistic in
assessing their abilities in relation to others compared to
participants with high self-regulation resources. In other
words, high self-regulation resources were associated with
a stronger above-average effect than low self-regulation
resources. Please note that optimistic illusions were not
fully eliminated by the ego-depletion manipulation.
STUDY 2
As mentioned in the introduction, researchers consis-
tently found that peoples’ beliefs in personal control often
are greater than can be justified. For example, they overes-
timate the probability that they were the cause of certain
outcomes (Miller & Ross, 1975) or overestimate the con-
trollability of chance-determined situations (for a review,
see Crocker, 1982). As in Study 1 for the above-average
effect, we assumed that positive illusions that concern the
construction and overestimation of personal control are
maintained by an active process that requires resources of
self-regulation. This proposition is supported by findings
that the overestimation of controllability (illusion of con-
trol; Harris & Middleton, 1994; McKenna, 1993) is espe-
cially strong among individuals with high internal locus of
control (who believe that they are actively capable of con-
trolling the occurrence of events; Hoorens & Buunk,
1993), which implies that self-control or the perception of
self-control, respectively, may be involved in the occur-
rence of exaggerated controllability. More directly,
research by Zadro et al. (2004) yielded that social exclu-
sion (which also was shown to consume self-regulatory
resources and thus work like an ego-depletion manipula-
tion; see DeWall & Baumeister, 2006) leads to a lowered
sense of control. Derived from this line of thought, in Study
2, we investigated whether ego depletion impairs the expe-
rienced sense of control. As in Study 1, participants were
or were not ego depleted and subsequently reported their
experienced controllability of winning a dice gamble
(which was indeed fully determined by chance).
Method
Participants and design. Ninety-seven students
(72 women, 25 men; 18-63 years of age; M = 25.33
SD = 10.04) from Ludwig-Maximilians-University,
Munich, participated in this experiment. It was based
on a 2 (ego depletion: low vs. high) × 2 (type of deple-
tion manipulation: cognitive vs. affective) factorial
design.
Material and procedure. As in Study 1, to increase
ecological validity, participants’ self-regulation resources
were manipulated by either an affective or cognitive
depletion procedure. The procedure, material, and
cover story were the same as in Study 1, with the excep-
tion that the measurement of the dependent variable
was framed as a second, unrelated experiment, which
was a pretest for another study to be conducted in the
future. Subsequent to the depletion manipulation, par-
ticipants were informed that the second study addressed
gambling behavior. The participants were informed that
they could throw a die. When the result was lower than
4, participants would receive a double experimental
credit (0.5 + 0.5 hours). However, if the result was 4 to
6, participants would receive no experimental credit at
all. Before they threw the die, participants were asked to
what extent (0 = extremely low, 10 = extremely high)
they were confident that they would win the game. At
the conclusion of the experiment, all participants
received a 1-hour experimental credit regardless of the
result of the gamble. Subsequently, participants were
debriefed, thanked for their participation, and
dismissed.
Results and Discussion
A 2 (ego depletion) × 2 (depletion manipulation)
analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant
main effect for the ego-depletion manipulation, F(1, 93) =
5.15, p = .03, η2 = .05, indicating that participants with
high resources of self-regulation (M = 3.70, SD = 1.14)
were more confident that they would win the game than
were participants with low resources of self-regulation
(M = 3.24, SD = 0.94). No further significant effects
occurred, all Fs < 1.
To summarize, participants with high resources of
self-regulation (low ego depletion) reported higher lev-
els of subjectively experienced control over a fully
chance-determined situation than did participants with
low resources of self-regulation (high ego depletion).
STUDY 3
The third area of Taylor and Brown’s (1988)
research on positive illusions addresses people’s ten-
dency to exhibit positive illusions about their future life;
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that is, people overestimate their probability of experi-
encing positive future events and, in contrast, underesti-
mate their probability of experiencing negative events in
the future. In line with the previous two studies, we
argued that the construction of an optimistic view about
one’s own future also requires considerable amounts of
self-regulation because to see a positive future for one-
self requires (a) perspective taking (they must imagine
themselves in the future), (b) retrieval of positive self-
attributes from memory and application to predict a
positive future status quo, and (c) suppression of nega-
tive attributes during this memory search. We assume
that these processes are resource-consuming activities
and thus reduce the available self-regulatory resources.
This line of reasoning was tested in a straightforward
manner in the next experiment.
Method
Participants and design. Fifty-six participants (34
women, 22 men; 16-47 years of age; M = 23.84, SD =
4.92) from Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich,
participated in this experiment. It was based on a 2 (ego
depletion: low vs. high) × 2 (type of future event: posi-
tive vs. negative) factorial design with repeated mea-
sures on the last factor.
Material and procedure. An alternative manipulation
of ego depletion was carried out (for a similar but par-
tially different manipulation, see Baumeister et al., 1998):
Participants were asked to participate in a study on con-
centration, mood, and personality. After signing an infor-
mative consent form, the ego-depletion manipulation was
conducted. Each participant was given a typewritten
sheet of paper with meaningless text (a page from a sta-
tistics book) and was told to cross off all occurrences of
the letter e. For the participants assigned to the high ego-
depletion condition, the task was designed to be very dif-
ficult, requiring them to consider and follow multiple
rules and to control their decisions permanently. They
were told that they should only cross off an e if it did not
occur next to another vowel or one letter away from
another vowel (thus, one would not cross the e in Peter).
Also, the photocopy of the stimulus page had been light-
ened, making it relatively more difficult to read and thus
requiring additional attention. In contrast, participants in
the nondepletion condition were given a high-quality
photocopy with good contrast and were instructed to
cross every single e with no further rules or restrictions.
After the depletion manipulation (which lasted about
10 to 15 min), to rule out alternative explanations based
on mood differences, participants’ positive and negative
emotions were measured with the Positive and Negative
Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
Next, participants reported on a scale from 0 (very
unlikely) to 10 (very likely) the subjective probabilities
that (a) in the future, their most important wishes would
be realized and (b) in the future, they will suffer from a
severe disease (the content of both items was derived from
previous research on future optimism; cf. Perloff & Fetzer,
1986, for the illness item; Markus & Nurius, 1986, for
the item on overall future optimism). At the completion of
the experiment, participants were informed about the real
aim of the investigation and were dismissed.
Results and Discussion
Check for interfering effects. The ego-depletion
manipulation had no effect on reported positive and
negative affect, all Fs < 1.83, all ps > .18. All of the fol-
lowing results remained constant when positive and
negative affect was controlled for in an ANCOVA.
Future optimism. A 2 (ego depletion) × 2 (type of
future event: positive vs. negative) ANOVA with
repeated measures on the second factor revealed a signif-
icant interaction between ego depletion and type of
future event, F(1, 54) = 9.05, p < .01, η2 = .14. Univariate
follow-up analyses, conducted separately for positive and
negative future events, indicated that ego-depleted partic-
ipants (M = 4.07, SD = 2.99) were less optimistic about
realizing their most important wishes than were nonde-
pleted participants (M = 5.76, SD = 2.63), F(1, 54) =
5.04, p = .03, η2 = .09. Moreover, ego-depleted partici-
pants (M = 5.07, SD = 1.75) reported higher probabilities
concerning their future vulnerability to a severe disease
than did nondepleted participants (M = 3.97, SD = 1.76),
F(1, 54) = 5.56, p = .02, η2 = .09 (see Figure 1).
To summarize, participants in the high ego-depletion
condition were less optimistic about their future than
nondepleted participants. Please note that compared to
Study 1, a limitation of both Studies 2 and 3 is that par-
ticipants indicated their sense of control (Study 2) and
future optimism (Study 3) not in comparison to a refer-
ence group (i.e., other average people).
STUDY 4
In the next study, we attempted to shed first light on
the underlying psychological processes involved in the
impact of ego depletion on the construction of positive
illusions. More specifically, we proposed that ego-
depleted individuals are less able to construct positive
illusions and positive views of the self because they are
less able to generate or retrieve positive self-relevant
information. Positive self-relevant pieces of information
are supposed to be elementary ingredients for the
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construction of positive illusions: We know from previous
research that people predominantly retrieve information
consistent with their prior beliefs or theories (Fiske &
Taylor, 1984; Greenwald, 1980) and, in turn, that the
accessibility of positive self-relevant information is
indeed positively associated with mental health (Taylor
& Brown, 1988). Other research (cf. Chaiken, Giner-
Sorolla, & Chen, 1996; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly,
1989) shows that people mostly hold favorably skewed
a priori knowledge about their standpoints and opin-
ions, which explicitly helps them to devalue inconsistent
and threatening information.
In short, ego-depleted individuals are supposed to be
less able to conduct an active memory search (and thus
find less positive self-attributes) than nondepleted individ-
uals. Derived from this line of argumentation, we investi-
gated whether depleted or nondepleted resources of
self-regulation differently affect the generation/retrieval of
positive and negative self-relevant attributes. Hence, in
Study 4, participants were or were not ego depleted and
subsequently wrote down as many positive and negative
self-relevant attributes about their self as they could gen-
erate or retrieve. It was expected that the difference
between positive and negative attributes would be lower
when people were depleted than when they were previ-
ously not depleted.
Method
Participants and design. One hundred and three
students (60 women, 43 men; 18-51 years of age; M =
31.16, SD = 7.30) from Ludwig-Maximilians-
University, Munich, participated in this experiment. It
was based on a 2 (ego depletion: low vs. high) × 2 (type
of depletion manipulation: cognitive vs. affective) × 2
(self-relevant attributes: positive vs. negative) factorial
design with repeated measures on the last factor.
Material and procedure. Again, participants were or
were not ego depleted by an affective and cognitive
depletion manipulation. The cover story, material, and
procedure were the same as in Study 1. Only the depen-
dent variables were different: After the depletion manip-
ulation, participants were asked to write down all of
their positive and negative self-relevant attributes and
characteristics. Participants had no time restrictions for
this task. Afterward, participants were debriefed,
thanked for their participation, and dismissed.
Results and Discussion
A 2 (ego depletion) × 2 (type of manipulation) × 2 (self-
relevant attributes) ANOVA with repeated measures on
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Figure 1 Probability of occurrence of positive and negative future events dependent on high and low ego depletion (Study 3).
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the last factor revealed a significant main effect for self-
relevant attributes, F(1, 99) = 60.64, p < .001, η2 = .38,
indicating that participants retrieved more
positive (M = 5.98, SD = 3.31) than negative attributes
(M = 4.35, SD = 2.50). Furthermore, a significant main
effect occurred for ego depletion, F(1, 99) = 9.50, p <
.01, η2 = .09, indicating that ego-depleted participants
(M = 4.42, SD = 1.82) retrieved fewer attributes than
did nondepleted participants (M = 5.96, SD = 3.27).
Most important for our line of reasoning, the analysis
of the experimental design revealed an interaction
between self-relevant attributes and ego depletion, F(1,
99) = 4.40, p = .04, η2 = .04. Follow-up analyses
revealed that the difference between reported positive
and negative attributes was stronger for nondepleted
(positive attributes: M = 7.00, SD = 3.77; negative
attributes: M = 4.92, SD = 3.14), F(1, 49) = 40.82, p <
.001, η2 = .45, than for ego-depleted participants (posi-
tive attributes: M = 5.02, SD = 2.49; negative attributes:
M = 3.81, SD = 1.55), F(1, 52) = 19.44, p < .001, η2 =
.27 (see Figure 2).
In summary, Study 4 revealed that ego-depleted
participants wrote down less positive attributes (or a
less-favorable ratio between positive and negative
attributes, respectively) about themselves than did the
nondepleted participants. A limitation of Study 4 was
that we did not measure another type of potential
positive illusion (e.g., future expectations or above-
average effect) and so were not able to test whether
the amount of generated/retrieved positive attributes
indeed mediated the impact of ego depletion on posi-
tive illusions. To test this line of thought more
directly, we conducted a fifth study in which we mea-
sured both the salient positive and negative self-relevant
attributes as well as the strength of the above-average
effect, positive future expectations, and perception of
control over the environment after the ego-depletion
manipulation.
STUDY 5
In the last study, we employed an alternative (more
cognitive) manipulation of ego depletion—the “white
bear” paradigm (cf. Muraven et al., 1998; Wegner,
Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). Participants were
instructed to imagine a walk through the zoo and write
down every animal they expected to see. Participants in
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Figure 2 Retrieved positive and negative personality attributes dependent on high and low ego depletion (Study 4).
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the high-depletion condition also were instructed not
to think about a white bear. Participants in the low-
depletion condition did not receive this extra instruc-
tion. Afterward, as in Study 4, participants wrote down
their positive and negative self-relevant attributes, com-
pared themselves on several self-relevant dimensions
with the average person, and answered questions on
future expectations as well as their subjective sense of
control and self-esteem.
To further elucidate the underlying psychological
processes, we also measured on a more exploratory basis
participants’ self-efficacy, which reflects the expectation
of being able to control challenging environmental
demands by means of taking adaptive action (Bandura,
1997; Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995; Schwarzer &
Scholz, 2000). Based on this definition, we think that the
subjective sense of self-efficacy may be a central compo-
nent of the active, nondepleted self and thus might be an
additional potential mediator for the effect of ego deple-
tion on the reduced ability to construct positive views of
the self (positive illusions).
Method
Participants and design. Thirty students (27 women, 3
men; 19-37 years of age; M = 22.57, SD = 3.35) from
Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich, participated
in this experiment. It was based on a one-factorial design
with ego depletion (low vs. high) as an independent
variable.
Material and procedure. First, self-regulation
resources were manipulated by the white bear paradigm
(Muraven et al., 1998). Participants were instructed to
imagine a walk through the zoo and write down every
animal that came to their mind. Ego-depleted partici-
pants also were instructed not to think about a white
bear; however, whenever they do so they should sup-
press this thought and mark a cross in the written
thought listing on their questionnaire. Participants in
the low-depletion condition did not receive any such
extra instruction. Next, as in Study 4, participants were
asked on an open questionnaire to write down all posi-
tive and negative self-relevant attributes that came to
their mind. Afterward, they answered questions con-
cerning the above-average effect, positive future expec-
tations, illusion of control, self-efficacy, and self-esteem,
which were derived from previous research in this area
(for an overview, see Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Specifically, positive future expectations were measured
using the following items on a scale from 0 (not at all)
to 10 (extremely): (a) “In the future, I will be successful
in my professional life”; (b) “In the future, I will never
suffer from a severe disease”; (c) “In the future, I will
have a good career”; (d) In the future, I will not suffer
any hardship”; and (e) In the future, I will have more
money than other people.” Because all items were
highly correlated (rs ranging between .33 and .80, all
ps < .08), they were collapsed onto a scale of future
optimism (α = .85). Positive views of the self concerning
above-average considerations were measured by the fol-
lowing items on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10
(extremely): (a) “To what extent do you think that you
are more intelligent than other people?” (b) “To what
extent do you think that you have a better memory than
other people?” (c) “To what extent do you think that
you are more attractive than other people?” (d) “To
what extent do you think that you are better at mathe-
matics than other people?” and (e) “To what extent do
you think that you are more successful in your job than
other people?” Because all items were highly correlated
(rs ranging between .26 and .66, all ps < .08, except one
correlation that was p = .15), they were collapsed into a
scale of future optimism (α = .85). Perceived control
was measured by the following items on a scale from 0
(not at all) to 10 (extremely): (a) “I have great control
over my life”; (b) “I have great control over my profes-
sional life (career)”; (c) “I have control of whether good
things will happen to me”; (d) “I have control of
whether bad things will happen to me”; and (e) “I am
fully responsible for my own success.” All items were
highly correlated (rs ranging between .36 and .76, all
ps < .05) and were thus were collapsed onto a scale of
perception of control (α = .85). Finally, participants
answered the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale (α =
.84) and replied to a 10-item questionnaire on general
self-efficacy (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) containing
10 items on a scale from 1 (not at all true) to 4 (exactly
true). Two examples of the items used are as follows: “I
always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard
enough” and “Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know
how to handle unforeseen situations” (α = .89). Finally,
participants completed the Rosenberg (1965) Self-
Esteem Scale. At the conclusion of the experiment, par-
ticipants were debriefed and thanked for participation.
Results and Discussion
Check for interfering effects. No differential impact of
the ego-depletion manipulation was found on positive and
negative emotions, F < 1. Moreover, controlling positive
and negative emotions as covariates did not substantially
change the direction of the results reported below.
Retrieved positive and negative self-relevant attributes.
For an overview, see also Table 2. A 2 (ego depletion) ×
2 (self-relevant attributes) ANOVA with repeated mea-
sures on the last factor revealed a significant main effect
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for the number of retrieved self-relevant attributes, F(1,
28) = 4.33, p < .05, η2 = .13, indicating that nondepleted
participants (M = 5.16, SD = 1.35) overall retrieved more
positive and negative self-relevant attributes than did
depleted participants (M = 4.18, SD = 1.20). Furthermore,
overall participants also retrieved more positive (M =
6.20, SD = 2.39) than negative attributes (M = 3.20,
SD = 1.22), F(1, 28) = 40.35, p < .001, η2 = .59. Finally,
and most important for our hypotheses, the latter main
effect was qualified by a marginal interaction between the
ego-depletion factor and the positive versus negative
retrieved attributes, F(1, 28) = 3.53, p = .07, η2 = .11.
Follow-up analyses yielded that ego-depleted participants
(M = 5.21, SD = 1.89) retrieved fewer positive self-relevant
attributes than did nondepleted participants (M = 7.06,
SD = 2.49), F(1, 28) = 5.13, p = .03, η2 = .16. No differ-
ence between depleted (M = 3.14, SD = 1.17) and non-
depleted participants (M = 3.25, SD = 1.29) was found
for retrieved negative attributes, F < 1.
Above-average comparisons, future optimism, and
perception of control. First, we collapsed the three sub-
scales for future optimism, above average, and percep-
tion of control into one overall scale of positive illusion
(α = .70) and conducted an ANOVA with ego depletion
as the independent variable. This analysis indicated that
ego-depleted participants overall are significantly less
optimistic (M = 4.27, SD = 0.96) than are nondepleted
participants (M = 5.09, SD = 1.18), F(1, 28) = 4.24, p =
.05, η2 = .13.
In the following, we conducted separate analyses for
the three single dimensions of positive illusions (i.e.,
above average, future optimism, perception of control).
With regard to the above-average effect, a one-factorial
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for ego deple-
tion, indicating that nondepleted participants assessed
themselves more favorably compared with the average
person (M = 5.17, SD = 1.47) than did depleted participants
(M = 4.16, SD = 1.07), F(1, 28) = 4.50, p = .04, η2 = .14.
In addition, concerning future optimism, a significant
main effect also occurred, indicating that nondepleted
individuals (M = 5.28, SD = 1.57) were more optimistic
about their future than were depleted individuals (M =
4.24, SD = 1.19), F(1, 28) = 4.03, p = .05, η2 = .13. No
significant difference between nondepleted (M = 4.83,
SD = 1.64) and depleted participants (M = 4.41,
SD = 1.30) was found for illusion of control, F < 1.
Self-esteem. A one-factorial ANOVA revealed no sig-
nificant main effect for ego depletion and self-esteem,
F(1, 28) = 2.49, p = .13, η2 = .08 (low depletion: M =
3.37, SD = 0.43; high depletion: M = 3.10, SD = 0.51).
Self-efficacy. A one-factorial ANOVA revealed a signif-
icant main effect for ego depletion, indicating that nonde-
pleted participants reported a higher sense of self-efficacy
(M = 2.92, SD = 0.50) than did depleted participants (M =
2.49, SD = 0.47), F(1, 28) = 5.80, p = .02, η2 = .17.
Mediational analyses I: Retrieved positive attributes.
To test whether the number of generated/retrieved pos-
itive self-attributes mediates the impact of ego deple-
tion on positive illusions (above-average effect, future
optimism), we performed mediational analyses
described by Baron and Kenny (1986). First, we corre-
lated the number of retrieved positive attributes with
the overall optimism scale (r = .39, p = .03), the above-
average subscale (r = .27, p = .16), the perception of
control subscale (r = .24, p = .20), and the future opti-
mism subscale (r = .43, p = .02). Because the number of
positive self-attributes only significantly correlated
with the overall scale of optimism and the future opti-
mism subscale, we only conducted mediational analy-
ses for these two criteria variables. First, when we
simultaneously predicted the overall scale of optimism
by the ego-depletion factor as well as the potential
TABLE 2: Means of the Experimental Conditions in Study 5
Experimental Condition
Low Depletion High Depletion Fa η2
Above-average effect 5.17 (1.47) 4.16 (1.07) 4.50* .14
Future optimism 5.28 (1.57) 4.24 (1.19) 4.03* .13
Perception of control 4.83 (1.64) 4.41 (1.30) < 1
Self-efficacy 2.92 (0.50) 2.49 (0.47) 5.80* .17
Self-esteem 3.37 (0.43) 3.10 (0.51) 2.49 .13
Positive attributes 7.06 (2.49) 5.21 (1.89) 5.13* .16
Negative attributes 3.25 (1.29) 3.14 (1.17) < 1
Overall positive self-view 5.09 (1.18) 4.27 (0.96) 4.24* .13
a. Univariate follow-up ANOVAs; df = 1, 28.
*p < .05.
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mediator for retrieved positive attributes, we found an
overall significant regression equation, R2 = .21, F(2,
27) = 3.49, p = .045. Although, the regression weight
of the ego-depletion factor was reduced and did not
further reach significance, β = –.25, t(27) = –1.32, p =
.20, the regression weight of the potential mediator for
retrieved positive attributes also did not reach signifi-
cance, β = .30, t(27) = 1.59, p = .12. Second, when we
simultaneously predicted future optimism by the ego-
depletion factor as well as the potential mediator for
retrieved positive attributes, we again found an overall
significant regression equation, R2 = .22, F(2, 27) =
3.89, p = .03. Positive attributes received a marginal
significant regression weight, β = .34, t(27) = 1.85,
p = .08, whereas the ego-depletion factor did not reach
significance, β = –.22, t(27) = –1.20, p = .24.
Mediational analyses II: Self-efficacy. In the next
step, we tested whether self-efficacy mediates the effect
of ego depletion on positive illusions. We correlated
self-efficacy with the overall scale of optimism (r = .65,
p < .001), above-average considerations (r = .44, p =
.02), and future optimism (r = .53, p = .003). Hence, we
conducted mediational analyses for these three vari-
ables. Concerning the overall optimism scale, a signifi-
cant regression equation was obtained when the
ego-depletion factor and self-efficacy were simultane-
ously employed to predict the overall optimism scale,
R2 = .44, F(2, 27) = 10.41, p < .001. Whereas self-
efficacy received a significant regression weight, β = .61,
t(27) = 3.81, p = .001, the ego-depletion factor no
longer reached significance, β = –.11, t(27) = –0.70, p =
.49. With regard to future optimism, a significant
regression weight was observed when future optimism
was simultaneously predicted by ego depletion and self-
efficacy, R2 = .30, F(2, 27) = 5.86, p = .01. Self-efficacy
received a significant regression weight, β = .46, t(27) =
2.62, p = .01, whereas the ego-depletion factor no
longer reached significance, β = –.16, t(27) = –0.93,
p = .36. Moreover, with regard to the above-average
effect, a significant regression equation was observed
when the above-average effect was simultaneously pre-
dicted by ego depletion and self-efficacy, R2 = .23, F(2,
27) = 4.02, p = .03. Whereas self-efficacy received a
marginal significant regression weight, β = .33, t(27) =
1.79, p = .085, the ego-depletion factor no longer
reached significance, β = –.24, t(27) = –1.27, p = .22. 
In summary, Study 5 replicated the findings of Study
4, that is, ego-depleted participants were less able to
generate/retrieve positive-self-relevant information from
their cognitive system. In addition and most important,
this differential retrieval process was shown to mediate
the impact of the ego-depletion manipulation on the
occurrence of positive views on the self (positive illusions).
Also, the underlying psychological processes also have
been elucidated by the finding that ego-depleted partic-
ipants reported a lower sense of self-efficacy and that
self-efficacy, in turn, mediated the impact of ego deple-
tion on positive illusions. A limitation of Study 5 is that,
at the levels of the subscales (above-average, future opti-
mism, control), a significant positivity-reducing effect of
ego depletion only was found for the subscales of above-
average and future optimism. Moreover, a substantial
mediation via retrieved positive attributes only was
found for the subscale of future optimism. Hence, the
impaired retrieval of positive self-relevant attributes
might not be the only mechanism that is impaired by a
state of ego depletion and thus leads to less-optimistic
self-views (we indeed found that the subjective sense of
self-efficacy is another important mediator in this con-
text). Consistent with the findings of Vohs et al. (2005,
Study 8), we did not find a significant impact of ego
depletion on reported self-esteem.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present investigation, we assumed that the con-
struction of positive views (positive illusions) about the
self can require the active self (self-regulation). More
specifically, we proposed that positive views on the self
may require complex defensive processes—such as sup-
pressing inconsistent or threatening self-relevant infor-
mation, searching the memory for positive self-relevant
information, and intentionally biasing the encoding, pro-
cessing, and retrieval of self-relevant information—and
thus, as a consequence, they might require self-regulatory
resources. The present investigation manipulated ego
depletion by having some participants engage in an initial
act of self-regulation. Participants were instructed to reg-
ulate their attention, thoughts, or emotional responses.
Afterward, the ability to construct positive views about
one’s own abilities, perception of control, and future
expectations was measured.
The results of these five studies consistently showed
that ego depletion impaired the ability to construct posi-
tive views of the self. More specifically, compared with
nondepleted participants, ego-depleted participants were
less optimistic about one’s own abilities (above-average
effect; Study 1), had a lower sense of control (illusion of
control; Study 2), and exhibited less-optimistic future
expectations (optimism; Study 3). Likewise, the present
research suggested that ego-depleted participants exhibit
less-optimistic illusions because their ability to generate
and retrieve positive self-relevant information has been
impaired (Studies 4 and 5) and because they have a low-
ered sense of general self-efficacy (Study 5). The main
implication of the present research is that a positive view
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of the self (positive illusions) requires the active self to
emerge. When the self is depleted by a prior regulatory
task, the ability to construct positive illusions is impaired.
Implications, Limitations, and Future Research
First, the present studies strengthened the limited
resource model. Self-control is an important resource
that is involved in many cognitive, motivational, and
behavioral processes or responses of human beings,
such as intellectual performance, decision making, or
physical stamina. The present investigation added posi-
tive views of the self (positive illusions) as another
phenomenon requiring resources of the active self.
Second, the present studies supported theoretical
models that postulate that optimistic perspectives and
positive illusions about the self are not only the result of
low-processing efforts. The data presented here suggested
that optimistic illusions can require the deliberate, active
role of the self to occur. Consequently, constructing and
maintaining a positive view of the self seems to be an
effortful process, which is easily impaired or reduced by
competing tasks that require the same regulatory
resource. By postulating and demonstrating these effects,
it initially appears that we contradict established research
concerning, for example, “automatic egotism” (Paulhus
et al., 1989), which demonstrated that self-evaluation
while performing another concurrent task led to more
(instead of less) positive self-views. However, the most
important methodological difference between our studies
and the work of Paulhus and colleagues is based in the
realm of how the dependent variable is measured.
Paulhus and colleagues asked participants to rate them-
selves on traits, so it was very easy to follow a simple rule
of embracing the positive and rejecting the negative.
Hence, the simpler and more positive responses that
Paulhus and colleagues observed when people were dis-
tracted by a concurrent task. In contrast, the present
research (especially Studies 4 and 5, which are supposed
to be those that most closely illuminate the underlying
psychological processes) required participants to gener-
ate/retrieve their own attributes from memory and intro-
spection. This requires considerably more work than
deciding about self-consistency or self-inconsistency and
may therefore explain why depleted participants fur-
nished less. Also, the procedure of the present Study 4 is
not as easy to bias with a simple positivity rule compared
with, for example, the procedure employed by Paulhus
et al. (1989). In the present research, participants were
asked to list “all of their positive and negative self-
relevant attributes and characteristics.” Thus, the
requirement by instruction was to be balanced and thor-
ough. In short, to integrate this with automatic egotism,
we think that depleted capabilities more easily lead
people to follow simple and positive rules when respond-
ing to attributes suggested by someone else, but when
they really must actively engage in the generation of their
own attributes, they have fewer resources with which to
bias the list of positive and negative attributes in their
favor.2 To move research in this area forward, future
studies could directly test whether ego depletion impairs
the construction of positive illusions based on rather
effortful processes but not those based on simpler, less-
effortful processes. This could be tested by an experiment
using a 2 (ego depletion) × 2 (rating difficulty) × 2 (judg-
ment) design. For example, after being depleted, partici-
pants could perform an easy task (e.g., rating themselves
and/or others) and a complex task (writing down positive
and negative attributes about self and/or others). Due to
our line of argumentation, one should find a three-way
interaction, such that the depletion manipulation matters
only when participants make difficult self-ratings.
Third, self-regulation resources seem to be an active
component of various types of optimistic illusions, such
as the perception of own abilities, controllability of the
external world, and future expectations. Thus, the pre-
sent research will help to reduce complexity in research
on positive illusions because self-regulatory resources
seem to be a common, important component of various
forms of this phenomenon. In addition, our research
revealed that the use of both attentional and emotional
control manipulations similarly reduced positive self-
views. This is a strong methodological feature of the
present studies and we recommend that similar types of
resource depletion are employed in future research
within the field of ego depletion and positive illusions.
Fourth, the present investigation clarified the psy-
chological processes underlying the impact of self-
regulatory resources on the construction of optimistic
illusions. Explicitly, ego-depleted participants generated
and retrieved less positive self-relevant information than
did nondepleted participants, which was shown to
mediate the impact of ego depletion on future optimism.
In addition, clearer results were found for self-efficacy,
which has been shown to be a substantial mediator for
the impact of ego depletion on overall optimistic views
of the self as well as specifically (in a somewhat attenu-
ated strength) for above-average considerations and
future optimism. Thus, our results lent support to the
assumption that the emergence of positive illusions
depends on the access to positive self-relevant informa-
tion and, in addition, demonstrated that the impact of
self-regulation on the occurrence of positive views of the
self (positive illusions) is significantly linked to the abil-
ity to generate or retrieve positive self-relevant informa-
tion as well as to the subjective experience of self-
efficacy (which is supposed to be a direct indicator of
the functioning self).
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Fifth, it is import to ask whether our findings are
unique to positive illusions or whether perhaps other eval-
uative judgments may be affected by ego-depletion manip-
ulations in the same direction. Although our own research
shows that ego depletion differently affects the external
information search (which is supposed to be based on a
simpler strategy than the judgment tasks and internal
memory search of the present research; in addition,
because the depleted self is less able to construct positiv-
ity, it might be useful to search at least for external self-
serving information; Fischer et al., 2007), to definitely rule
out this point empirically, future research would need to
simultaneously compare positive illusions with some other
types of (less self-relevant) judgments and then show that
the ego-depletion manipulation has a greater or differen-
tial effect on the former than the latter.
Sixth, it is important to note that task difficulty of
employed ego-depletion manipulations might represent
an alternative explanation for our data. More specifi-
cally, failure to follow the instructions of the experi-
menter (e.g., to suppress emotions, redirect attention, or
override behavioral rules—especially in the very diffi-
cult version of the depletion task employed in Study 4
[crossing the es]) might have directly led to lower
impressions and/or assessments of the self and the self’s
abilities, which could have contributed directly to a
lower sense of optimism and less-optimistic views of the
self’s attributes. In other words, it is possible that partici-
pants in the ego-depletion conditions had difficulties with
successful self-regulation, which led to lower self-evaluations
and, in turn, to lower self-enhancement. However, this
argument applies less to the other studies of the present
research (which employed fewer performance-oriented
manipulations of regulatory resources, such as the sup-
pression of emotions or thoughts), so the rule of parsi-
mony would downplay it as an alternative explanation.
However, it would be an interesting avenue for future
research that investigated the interplay between ego-
depletion manipulations with different difficulty levels
and associated failure experiences, the perception of the
self’s abilities, and the construction of positive illusions.
Another related alternative explanation for our find-
ings can be derived from empirical work and theorizing
by Wegner and colleagues (e.g., Wegner, 1994; Wegner,
Erber, & Zanakos, 1993), who set forth the ironic process
theory, which postulates that mental control processes
are based on two different processes, one conscious and
deliberate process (intentional operating process) and
one rather unconscious, automatic process (ironic mon-
itoring process). For example, when people try to expe-
rience positive emotions, the intentional operating
process helps them to deliberately select positive
thoughts from their memory (because they are expected
to support the attainment of a positive mood state). In
contrast, the ironic monitoring process works in the
background to check for when mental control attempts
failed (e.g., negative thoughts came to the conscious
mind) and thus the whole process should be started
again. Especially important for our line of research is the
assumption that this ironic monitoring process detects
failures of mental control and thus increases the salience
of mental contents that are associated with these failures
(cf. Higgins & King, 1981; Lombardi, Higgins, &
Bargh, 1987). The counterintuitive result would be that
individuals who try to find positive thoughts will auto-
matically as a byproduct increase the accessibility of neg-
ative thoughts, too. According to Wegner et al. (1993),
this should be especially true when the resources of the
deliberate processing system are reduced, for example,
by cognitive load, stress, or time pressure. Hence, our
results that ego-depleted participants are less optimistic
and retrieve less positive self-relevant attributes could be
a consequence of this ironic monitoring process detect-
ing failures of mental control (which should be signifi-
cantly increased in the high-depletion conditions) rather
than of attenuated resources to construct positive illu-
sions. Accordingly, it would be an important question
for future research on ego depletion and positive illu-
sions to investigate whether ego-depletion effects can be
reinterpreted within the alternative theoretical perspec-
tive of the ironic process theory.
Finally, the external validity of our findings has to
be discussed. For example, previous research yielded
individuals who, after facing life-threatening situations
(e.g., cancer diagnoses; Taylor & Lobel, 1989),
behaved rather self-enhancing (by conducting down-
ward comparisons). Thus, it seems that even under
extremely aversive and difficult circumstances, people
are able to manage to construe positive views of them-
selves. Along those same lines, it might be a fruitful
endeavor for future research to investigate the avail-
ability of regulatory resources in situations of extreme
adversity.
NOTES
1. Please note that this effect was not found for participants under
cognitive load.
2. We want to thank Professor Dr. Roy Baumeister for this important
and very helpful case for how to integrate our work with contradictory
findings on automatic egotism.
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